INTRODUCTION
Within diagnostic reasoning there have been a number of proposals of what constitutes a . diagnosis, an� so pr e; sumably, what constitutes an optimal or mo � t likely di agnosis. These include most probable posterior h � poth esis [Pearl 1986 ], most probable interpretation lPearl, 1987] , most probable provable hypothesis [Reiter, 1987 , de Kleer and Williams, 1987 , de Kleer et al., 1990 , most probable covering hypothesis [Reggia et al., 1985 , Peng and Reggia, 1987a , Peng and Reggia . ' 1987b . Un like earlier logic-based diagnoses that consider what can be proven about a faulty device [Genes � reth, 1984�, th � e papers have considered that the quest10 � � �at i . s a di agnosis?" is important to answer. The mt � itlOn IS � h � t it is important to characterise the set of "logical possibil ities" for a diagnosis, presumably to be able to compare them. Most of these approaches assume that the most likely diagnosis must be computed, and that a definition of the what should be computed can be made a priori, independently of what the diagnosis is used for.
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Once the sets of hypotheses considered as diagnoses are determined one of the ways we may want to compare competing diagnoses to give us the most likely diagnosis is by using probability [de Kleer and Williams, 1987 , Neufeld and Poole, 1987 , de Kleer and Williams, 1989 , Pearl, 1987 . In computing the probability of A given B, p(AIB), Bayesian analysis tells us that the B should be all of the available evidence [Kyburg, 1988 , Pearl, 1988 ], but does not give us any hints as to what A should be. This paper asks the question of what combination of hypotheses A should be in order to be most usef � l.
In this paper we study six approaches to dia � nos tic reasoning, and their associated notions of opt � al ity based on probability theory (or another uncertamty calculus). Each approach considers a conjunction ? f hy potheses as a most likely diagnosis. We call the slX ap proaches:
1. most likely single-fault hypothesis; 2. most likely posterior hypothesis;
3. most likely interpretation; 4. probability of provability; 5. covering explanations; and 6. utility-based explanation. We contrast the first five approaches to diagnostic rea soning with a classic utility-based approach to diagnostic reasoning [Ledley and Lusted, 1959] . . In analysing these proposals, we show that the differ ent definitions of optimal diagnosis have different qual itative (and quantitative) results, even given � he sa � e input data. Moreover, we argue that the diagnostic problem, as currently posed, is incomplete: it does . �ot consider how the diagnosis is to be used, or the utility associated with either the diagnosis or the treatment of the abnormalities. We argue that the most appropri ate definition of (optimal) diagnosis should be based on what the diagnosis is used for. The point of this paper is to question current approaches to formalising diagnos tic reasoning, and hopefully focus attention on crucial questions not being studied.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation and discusses what the diagnostic problem should entail. Section 3 formally defines the six approaches to diagnosis studied in this paper. Section 4 shows examples of how the diagnoses produced by the different approaches are qualitatively different. Section 5 discusses the proposals, evaluating their strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Section 6 draws a few conclusions.
2
WHAT IS THE DIAGNOSTIC PROBLEM?
Notation
We call E the knowledge used to compute a diagnosis. E can be broken down into a set F of facts which are unchanging from instance to instance (e.g. F can be a model of a circuit which is being diagnosed), and a set 0 of observations concerning a particular instance. We call H = { h1, ... , hm} the set of hypotheses under con sideration given E. T = {t1, ... , tl} is the set of possible treatments. This diagnostic problem can be formalised in either probabilistic or logical terminology. In terms of logi cal terminology, we use the Theorist framework of hy pothetical reasoning , Poole, 1987 , a formalism well suited to the task as the paradigms can be naturally represented in the simple formal framework. Theorist [Poole, 1987] is defined as follows. The user pro vides F, a set of closed formulae (called the facts) and H, a set of open formulae (called the possible hypothe ses). A scenario is a set DUF where Dis a conjunction of hypotheses D = 1\ i hi for some i = 1, ... , m, such that D U F is consistent. An explanation of formula g is a scenario that logically implies g. An extension is the set of logical consequences of a maximal (with respect to set inclusion) scenario.
For a given treatment r s;;; T, we define a utility function u(E, D, r) . Using a standard decision-theoretic approach (e.g. [Berger, 1985] ), the goal of diagnostic reasoning can be defined as choosing r to maximise u(E, D, r) . If there are probability distributions de fined over E and D, then the maximum expected utility, &[u(E, D, r)], is required. For example, if for diagno sis i, i = 1, ... ,k, the utility associated with treating diagnosis Di is u(E, Di, r) = ai, and diagnosis Di oc curs with probability p(Di), the goal is to choose r to maximise E i ( ai · p(Di)). In computing expected utility values, influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1981, Shachter, 1986] can be used to find the treatment with highest utility.
Diagnostic Problem
A complete diagnostic cycle consists of reasoning from evidence E to hypothesised diagnosis H, and then ad ministering a treatment T for the diagnosis (or abnor malities). This is shown in Figure 1 .
In most current formal theories of diagnosis (e.g. [Reiter, 1987 , Peng and Reggia, 1987a , de Kleer and Williams, 1987 , Pearl, 1987 , Pople, 1982 ), the treat ment phase is not considered at all, and diagnoses are defined with respect to the evidence-hypothesis phase only. These approaches ignore utility considerations to tally. It is interesting to note that in one of the earli est analyses of medical diagnostic reasoning, Ledley and We argue that diagnostic reasoning must take into ac count the complete cycle, and should consider utility maximisation. In using a utility-based approach, the definition of a diagnosis is strongly influenced by how the diagnosis is to be used.
There are a number of possible uses of a diagnosis, including:
1. to find out the thing (or things) that is wrong; that is, through testing, to determine the exact state of the world with respect to the symptoms observed; 2. to give a plausible account (an explanation) for the symptoms; that is, to give a description of what is wrong that is understandable to people; 3. to enable a decision as to how to fix something; that is, to maximise the utility derived from the diagnos tic process through the treatment of the abnormal ities; 4. to fix the symptoms; in some cases we may be happy to fix the symptoms without caring about what is really wrong. The first of these may be carried out by someone who is trying to determine what errors occur so that they can be prevented (for example, by redesigning some compo nents). The second and the third are both activities that an ideal doctor must undertake. As well as giving optimal treatment they also have to be able to give a ra tionale for the treatment. The fourth may be something that has to be done in an emergency, for example reduc ing the temperature of a patient with fever, or restoring power in a failed power station.
While each of these may seem reasonable, we will see that different goals will lead to different evaluation cri teria. For example, the best decision may involve av eraging over many cases, which may not be conducive to a good explanation. Also there may be no point in finding the exact causes for a problem if further refine ment of the problem will not improve the outcome. In computing explanations, the most coherent explanation may not contain all the evidence or hypotheses.
It is important to keep these different goals in mind when considering different proposals. which is true. Hence, if hypothesis hi is the proposed single-fault hypothesis, the single-fault diagnosis Hi is 7ii 1\ 7i2 1\ • · • 1\ hi 1\ · · · 1\ h,;; = hi 1\ 1\ i ¢i 7ij. For example, if an electrical circuit contains m components, a single fault diagnosis is that component i is faulty and all other components are functioning normally. The most likely diagnosis is defined as the diagnosis with the highest probability, p(HiiE), over the set i E {1, ... , m}.
Most likely posterior hypothesis
As in the single-fault approach, the hypotheses consid ered are the unit hypotheses, h1, ... , hm. The most likely diagnosis is defined as the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability p(hi IE). This is the approach taken in MEDAS [Ben-Bassat et al., 1980] , INTERNIST [Pople, 1982] , and by Pearl [1986] , for example. Pearl frames his analysis within Bayesian networks. This entails defining a causal graph of the problem, where the nodes represent random variables (or propositions) and directed edges represent direct causal influences between random variables.
Most likely interpretation
This approach entails considering the set I = { h, ... , Ik} of interpretations, the set of truth assignments for the propositions in H. The interpretation which is most likely given the evidence must be determined. Pearl [1987] defines this optimal interpretation as the interpre tation which has the highest posterior probability given the evidence, p(IdE), where there is no Ij such that p(IdE) < p(Ij IE). Reiter and Mackworth [1990] ad vocate considering all visual interpretations for a given image formalised as a set of logical clauses. Note that all interpretations need not be computed in order to find the most likely one [Pearl, 1987] .
Probability of provability
In this case we use a logical axiomatisation of the prob lem, as well as a probabilistic model of the domain. The logical model is used to prove the logical possibili ties of the observations 0 (which constitute the set of hypotheses in which one is interested), and then the probabilistic model is used to compute the likelihood of these. This corresponds to finding the most likely consistency-based diagnosis [Reiter, 1987 , Poole, 1989b , de Kleer et al., 1990 .
In terms of normal and abnormal function of system components, a consistency-based diagnosis is defined as:
A consistency-based diagnosis is a minimal set of abnormalities such that the observations are consistent with all other components acting normally [Reiter, 1987] .
This approach entails axiomatising the problem as a logical theory 7 which consists of a set E of clauses rep resenting 0 and F. From E a set r of clauses logically entailed by E can be derived. This set can be defined as a minimal disjunct of maximal conjuncts of elements of 48 H that follow from E, 1 i.e.
Each conjunct is defined to be a diagnosis.
In order to compute the probabilities of the elements of r, a probability distribution (or some other measure) must be assigned to E. Then the measure assigned to the 'Yi E r must be computed.
One method of such a computation is provided by the ATMS, as described in [de Kleer and Williams, 1987] or [Provan, 1990, Laskey and Lehner, 1990] .2 An assump tion can be assigned to each clause Ei E E to symboli cally represent the measure assigned to Ei. The ATMS then computes the set of assumptions assigned to each literal consistent with E. Consequently, the assumption set associated with each 'Yi can be computed. Assigning a measure to each assumption enables the measure for each 'Yi to be derived.
The causal relationship in this approach has been de scribed by Pearl [1988] as evidential, as the direction of causality proceeds from evidence to cause.
Covering explanations
In this case the goal is to abduce a causal explanation of the observations. Definition 3.2 (Abductive Diagnosis) Given a causal axiomatisation of the system, an abductive di agnosis is a minimal set of hypotheses which, together with the background knowledge implies the observations 0 , Poole, 1989a .
As in the provability approach, a logical axiomatisation is required. More formally, the hypotheses considered are the minimal conjunct of elements of H that imply 0 from F (cf. [Poole, 1987] ):
Each conjunct is an explanation or diagnosis.
Abduction is used to compute a causal explanation for the observations. Note that the background knowledge F must be axiomatised differently in this a p proach and the previous one [Poole, 1988 Another method of describing this approach using graph theory is that of a. causal bipartite graph [Reg gia et al., 1985] . In such a. graph the bipartite edge sets consist of cause nodes and observation nodes, with di rected edges from cause nodes to observation nodes. A node covering of causes for a given set of observation nodes is required.
A probabilistic analysis of this approach can be found in Reggia, 1987a, Peng and Reggia, 1987b] and in [Neufeld and Poole, 1987] . Peng and Reggia [1987b] and Neufeld and Poole [1987] describe a method of com puting the best diagnoses by evaluating the best partial diagnoses only.
1See, for example, [Reiter, 1987] , [de Kleer and Williams, 1987] or [de Kleer et al., 1990] Pearl [Pearl, 1988] 
3.6

Utility-hued explanation
This approach computes not the most probable conjunc tion of hypotheses (or diagnosis), but the conjunction of hypotheses that are most useful for the treatment phase of diagnosis.
To compute utilities, we can use the definition of a Bayesian network (as done in the first two approaches described in the paper) augmented with a set of deci sion nodes, a value node and utility values (an influence diagram [Shachter, 1986] ).
This approach makes no commitment as to which set of hypotheses constitute a diagnosis, unlike the logic based approaches (approaches 3 and 4). Bayesian net works can also be used to compute the probability of any conjunction of hypotheses, by creating a new node that represents the conjunction of the hypotheses of the nodes it is influenced by.
Dependent on the utilities of a given problem instance, different combinations of hypotheses will be considered. In general, utility can be assigned on a problem by prob lem basis. Obviously, dependent on the utility func tion chosen, this approach can end up computing differ ent combinations of hypotheses than for the "diagnosis" from the first five approaches.
The utility-based approach is influenced by work in computer vision, planning and in cognitive science in which a high-level description of the task influences both the objective function to be evaluated and the method of solving the task. For example, in computer vision, model-based object recognition systems use a descrip tion of the object to speed recognition of the object by looking for only image primitives which will most likely constitute a part of the object [Chin and Dyer, 1986] .
We argue that the problem representation must be de pendent on the nature of the diagnosis required. Thus, if distinguishing among diagnoses does not aff ect the de cision made, there is no point to computing the different diagnoses, or an optimal diagnosis. Or, if the utility value is indifferent to particular liver diseases or heart diseases, the problem can be reformulated (e.g. all liver diseases considered as a "group", and all heart diseases considered as another "group").
As another example, consider a computer which has four main circuit boards, each of which can be divided into groups of components. If the computer goes down due to hardware failure, then the optimal diagnosis for a situation in which the computer must be fixed as soon as possible is to identify which circuit boards need to be replaced. If there is no time pressure, the optimal diagnosis may be to identify which group of components, or which specific components, must be replaced, given the high cost of replacing entire boards. ARE THEY REALLY ALL THE SAME?
In this section we demonstrate that the approaches do indeed give different answers. 
Suppose we observe that there is a current flowing through the circuit. Let E be the proposition that rep resents this evidence. The diagnoses computed by each of the approaches are now examined. We first give the interpretations as the the probabilities of all interpreta tions serves as a generator for all the probabilities.
The 16 possible interpretations are: All of the other posterior probabilities can be gen erated from the P i· In particular, for any formula w we have p(wiE) = p(IIE) {I:w is true in I} 2. All of the interpretations that are not possible have probability zero. The last 5 interpretations are not possible given the circuit, and so must have proba bility zero. Note that there was no need to do any logical pruning before the probability phase. The logical axiomatisation of the provability and cover ing cases ( 4 and 5) was not to remove impossible in terpretations (as in [Ledley and Lusted, 1959] ) but to determine what it is that we are getting the prob ability of.
Single-fault. The possible single-fault diagnoses are obtained by saying that all of the interpretations except P 7, P u, P1s and P14 are impossible. There is only one possible single fault diagnosis: a is shorted. This does not depend on any prior probabilities, ex cept for the knowledge that the probability is zero for all of the impossible diagnoses. Numerically, the posterior probabilities are:
The most likely faulty component is b. Interpretation. The highest probability is P 9, which indicates that the most likely interpretation is that b and c are shorted, and a and d are not shorted.3 Provability. In the fourth case we need to axiomatise the circuit:
and find the probabilities of the resulting diagnoses:
p(AIE) = Po + Pl + P2 + Ps + P4 + P5 +P6 + P1 p(B 1\ CjE) = Po+ Pl + Ps + Ps p(B A DIE) = Po+ P2 + Ps + Plo· 3Note that this diagnosis just coincidentally corresponds to the most likely posterior hypothesis (in that they both have b broken). If we changed the priors slightly to make p(C) = 0.12, the most likely interpretation becomes the one with just A true, but the most likely posterior hypothesis is unchanged.
Numerically, the probabilities are:
The most likely diagnosis is that a is shorted. { + $1 ifF:: E r 1\ XED::
u(E, D::, r) = -$1 ifF:: E r 1\ X ¢ D:: 0 otherwise
In this case, since p(BIE) is greater than 0. 5, we ex pect to gain from fixing gate b, but do not gain from fixing any of the other gates. Thus it is only worthwhile fixing gate b.
If one believes that the aim of the diagnosis is to fix all of the problems, then this is a peculiar thing to do. Based on the logical analysis, it cannot be the case that only b is shorted. In this case, all gates will be replaced in our example. All we needed to compute was the posterior probabilities for the individual hypotheses. Example 4.4 Suppose we can fix up gates b and c in dependently, but that the ways to fix up gates a and d interact in a complex way. In this case the relevant probabilities are
It might coincidentally happen that two approaches compute the best qualitative diagnosis, but this is not true in general. It is, however, not coincidence that the provability and covering approaches produce the same answer. It can be shown that, under certain reasonable assumptions about how the knowledge is represented, the propositional versions of the abductive and the de ductive systems [Poole, 1988] are identical. This is not, however, necessarily true for the non-propositional ver sions. The difference arises because of the level of detail of the diagnoses. The more specific the diagnoses, the less likely it is. The abductive systems require the level of detail specific enough to imply the observations. In the deductive system, the level of detail is prescribed, not by the observation, but by the knowledge base [Poole, 1989a] .
5
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
Each of the proposals has good and bad points, some of which are now discussed.
Single-fault Diagnosis
The main problem with the most likely single fault hy pothesis is that it may be wrong. The real diagnosis may be a combination of faults. Another problem is that the single fault definition de pends on the representation used. At one level of ab straction a single fault may be a very complicated com bination of faults at another level of detail. For example, at one level of abstraction a problem may be that one power supply is broken. At another level of detail there may be a number of pwblerns with the one power supply.
Most Likely Posterior
There are a number of problems with the "most likely posterior hypothesis" approach:
1. It is the weakest statement about the world. Thus, if a pigeon is a type of bird, one must have p(pigeoniE) $ p(birdiE).
2. High (possibly irrelevant) priors may dominate the relevant hypotheses. 3. Groups of hypotheses are not considered. This ap proach cannot compute diagnoses which consist of sets of hypotheses. Multiple-hypothesis diagnoses can be determined by heuristics only (e.g. as is done in INTERNIST [Pople, 1982] ). In contrast, the in terpretation, consistency and covering methods can compute multiple-hypothesis diagnoses based on the underlying theory of the method. Note that this does not imply we cannot diagnose systems with multiple faults, but rather that we do not consider conjunctions in diagnoses. Note that we can add hypotheses which are con junctions of hypotheses, but these will always be less likely that the original hypotheses. 
Most Likely Interpretation
In the most likely interpretation approach (# 3) there can be an exponential number of interpretations, and so for any reasonable sized problem we do not want to de rive all interpretations (as in [Reiter and Mackworth, 1990] ). Many interpretations will be highly unlikely, and computing them will be a waste of computational resources. However, it is not necessary to enumerate all interpretations [Pearl, 1987, de Kleer and Williams, 1989 ]4• Another drawback of this approach is that the most likely interpretation does not let us be agnostic about any proposition; we have to give a truth value to every hypothesis, no matter how related to the observations. Changing the space of hypotheses can change the prob ability of the most likely composite, and even what the most likely composite is [Pearl, 1988, p.285) . Even more importantly, for building large knowledge bases adding "irrelevant" hypotheses can also change the most likely interpretation. If we imagine a random variable that is probabilistica.ll y independent of the other variables, then the most likely qualitative conjunct will remain the same: we will end up with the product of the most likely prior of the irrelevant hypothesis and the most likely in terpretation. If however the new random variable is not independent, then just by imagining different scenarios we can change the qualitative diagnosis, as the following example shows.
Example 5.1 Consider a. patient who has symptoms which suggest either the flu or yellow fever, the flu be ing the more likely diagnosis. Now, suppose we add a variable that represents where the person was at some particular time two weeks previously. We partition the world so that the different places all have equal probabili ties (e.g., "Africa" may be one area, and "above the most northerly fioor tile in their office" may be another). If these new variables are independent of the disease vari able, the most likely interpretation will consist of the most likely values for each variable. Simply by assuming that it is much more likely that the patient has yellow fever if she was in Africa, the most likely composite hy pothesis may be that the patient has Yellow fever and was in Africa5• One other problem with finding the most likely in terpretation is that the most likely interpretation may have very low probability. Peng and Reggia [1987c] first pointed this out and suggested that rather than finding the most likely interpretation, we should find a set of interpretations that covers some percentage of all of the cases.
�Note that the phase of removing interpretations inconsis tent with the knowledge (i.e., those interpretations that are not models of the logical constraints) is unnecessary because p(hi\E) = 0 if h; is inconsistent with evidence E.
&This example is different from the example given by Pearl [1988, p. 285] , in that we are adding a new hypothesis rather than changing a hypothesis. Just by imagining a new hy pothesis, and making no new observations, we can change the value of the most likely interpretation. Approaches 4 and 5 are discussed together because propositional versions of these approaches have been shown to produce the same results under certain assump tions [Poole, 1988] . These differ from the interpretation approach in enabling us to be agnostic about the value of some variables which are irrelevant to the goal.
Consistency and Covering Approaches
These logic-based approaches are limited to what is prov able within the logical theory T. Hence, they are sensi tive to the particular logical description. If an observa tion is not provable, then nothing can be said about it. (Similarly, for the Bayesian approach, if the appropri ate conditional probabilities are present for an observa tion, no � easure c�� be assigned to the observation.) In contrast, m the utility-based approach considered here what is computed depends on the goal of the diagnosis:
Both the consistency and covering approaches rely on making assumptions about the system under examina tion. Pearl [1990] has shown that this approach has two major flaws: (1) independencies among events with unkn � wn probabilities cannot be represented; and (2) domam knowledge describing defeasible conditional sen tences cannot be represented. Thus, these approaches are limited to problems in which the domain knowledge can be defined in categorical terms, e. g. strict taxo nomic hierarchies, deterministic systems (electronic cir cuits but not medical diagnosis or default reasoning), etc. If these approaches are misapplied to certain domains non-intuitive results can be obtained. '
. Pearl [1990] argues that instead of making assump tiOns about the hypotheses, examining the logical con sequenc; � s of these assumptions, and then assigning a probability measure over the assumptions a probability measure should be assigned over the logical clauses :E and the probabilities assigned to interpretations be ex a . mined (as . done in approach 2). If not all clauses are as � Igned a weight, then probability bounds (specifically the mner and outer measure) can be obtained for the mea sure assigned to the h � potheses. For example, Nilsson [1986] presents a techmque which can accept an incom plete pr � babilistic specification, and computes ranges for the reqmred measures for hypotheses. This paper argues that it is not clear that the approach suggested by Pearl (i.e. that the most likely interpretation must be evalu ated) is always the best one. However, because these logic-based approaches seem to be appealing for a number of reasons, it may be impor tant to determine subcases of non-categorical domains in which paradoxes do not arise.
Utility-based diagnoses
The utility-based approach assumes that utilities are domain-dependent, which implies that diagnoses must be domain-dependent as well. In contrast, the other approaches assume that the definition of diagnosis is domain-independent. In addition, preferences used to define best diagnoses cannot be assigned in a domain independent manner. Doyle and Wellman [1989] have proven that there exists no universall y-valid preference 53 set; in other words, preferences are consistent onl y within particular domains. Furthermore, Doyle [1989j argues for a decision-theoretic, and not merely probabilistic definition of consistency and rationality in decision� making (and therefore diagnosis).
T � e util . it ! -based approa : h is considered the proper o � e m declSion theory and m several areas of cognitive science. For example, in visual recognition it has been shown . how several low-level (and quite primitive) pre attentive processes are used to focus attention on the � ost salient features of a scene [Treisman, 1982] , and simple features are used to guide scene interpretation [Rose � feld, 1987] . In some cases, results from these pre attentive processes are used directly to initiate action. For example, in the forest if a deer sees motion close by (the presence of motion in the visual field can be detected pre-attentively), it will start running without identifying the cause of the motion, as it might get eaten if it spent the time trying to identify the cause of the motion. If the deer is not in danger, motion can trigger a closer scrutiny for the cause of the motion.
One of the problems of the utility-based approach is that there is nothing in a diagnosis unless there is a goal and utilities. There is no ''value free" definition of a diagnosis. Whether this is desirable or not is left up to t � e reader. There is also the problem of being able to g1ve someone an understandable explanation to answer the question "what is wrong?". ? osis Is, showmg them to be mutually incompatible. It IS not clear that one definition is correct over all domains and situations, and for all possible uses that there could be for the diagnosis. Instead, we argue that the notion of most likely diagnosis cannot be defined a priori, but is defined based on what the diagnosis is to be used for and o . n the uitlity of the outcomes of treating the abnor:Oali ties. In other words, there may be no a priori ontological definition of optimal diagnosis; it is epistemological and situation-dependent.
